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TURNING PLOWSHARES INTO SWORDS
AND BANANAS INTO BARRETTAS:
A CALL FOR A REVISION TO THE UCMJ




The United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
("CAAF") recently decided the issue of whether unloaded firearms
are to be considered "dangerous weapons" for purposes of a
conviction for assault with a dangerous weapon. The CAAF's
decision ended a dispute among various military justice decisions.
The CAAF concluded that under Article 128 of the Uniform Code
of Military Justice ("UCMJ") an unloaded firearm was not a
dangerous weapon. However, a dissenting opinion disagreed and
went so far as to say that denying that an unloaded firearm is a
dangerous weapon is tantamount to turning swords into plowshares
and Barrettas into bananas.' This Article will examine the lower
military courts' disagreement as to whether or not an unloaded
firearm is a dangerous weapon for purposes of Article 128, and the
CAAF's decision on the issue. It will then suggest that, in the wake
of the CAAF's decision, either the Manual for Courts-Martial or
Article 128 of the UCMJ should be revised to include an unloaded
* B.A., Cum Laude, Yeshiva University, 1993; J.D., with honors, Columbia
University, 1996. C.O.A., with honors, Parker School of International and
Comparative Law, 1996. Associate, Sidley & Austin. This article expresses only
the views of the author. For a previous work of the author in the area of criminal
justice see Art & Atrocity: Cultural Depravity Justifies Cultural Deprivation, 8
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 699 (1998).
United States v. Davis, 47 M.J. 484, 488 (C.A.A.F. 1998) (Sullivan, J.,
dissenting).
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firearm as a dangerous weapon. The Article will then examine why
such a revision is desirable and why such a revision meets the
theories of punishment generally accepted in American jurispru-
dence.
I. LOWER MILITARY APPELLATE COURTS' INTERPRETATION OF
"DANGEROUS WEAPON"
Article 128 of the UCMJ provides in part, that "[a]ny person
subject to this chapter who ... commits an assault with a danger-
ous weapon or other means or force likely to produce death or
grievous bodily harm ... is guilty of aggravated assault.",2 Article
128 does not define dangerous weapon.3 However the Manual for
Courts-Martial ("Manual") states that "an unloaded pistol, when
presented as a firearm and not as a bludgeon, is not a dangerous
weapon or a means of force likely to produce grievous bodily
harm, whether or not the assailant knew it was unloaded."4 The
Manual focuses on whether the firearm objectively had the ability
to cause grievous harm, not on the victim's subjective state of
mind.
This Part analyzes several cases decided at the Court of Military
Review level that have interpreted the Manual's definition of
dangerous weapon. These cases, including the United States v
Turner case examined in Part II, have disagreed about whether an
unloaded weapon is a dangerous weapon under the Manual
provisions. Consequently, these cases formed the basis for the
CAAF decision in United States v Davis, examined in Part III of
this Article.
A. United States v Sullivan
In United States v. Sullivan, the defendant pointed his loaded
pistol at another soldier during a dispute over brewing coffee in the
barracks.5 Although the firearm in Sullivan was loaded, the United
2 UCMJ art. 128(b), 10 U.S.C.S. § 928(b) (Law. Co-op. 1985).
' Id. § 928.
4 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, I 54c(4)(ii) (1995 ed.).
' 36 M.J. 574 (A.C.M.R. 1992).
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States Army Court of Criminal Appeals went out of its way to state
that an unloaded firearm brandished in a threatening manner is also
a dangerous weapon.6 In Sullivan, the Army Court of Military
Review stated that provisions of the Manual that excluded unloaded
firearms from the definition of "dangerous weapons" were "no
longer valid."' The Sullivan court's decision was based on the
Supreme Court's decision in McLaughlin v United States.8 In
McLaughlin, the Supreme Court ruled that an unloaded firearm was
in fact a dangerous weapon for purposes of the federal bank
robbery statute that was at issue. 9 As the Supreme Court stated:
[A] gun is an article that is typically and characteristically
dangerous; the use for which it is manufactured and sold
is a dangerous one, and the law reasonably may presume
that such an article is always dangerous even though it may
not be armed at a particular time or place. In addition, the
display of a gun instills fear in the average citizen; as a
consequence, it creates an immediate danger that a violent
response will ensue. 0
B. United States v. Rivera
In United States v Rivera the defendant pointed an unloaded
firearm at two other soldiers, while attempting to escape from
custody." The United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals
ruled in Rivera that an unloaded firearm is not a dangerous weapon
under the UCMJ. The Rivera court reasoned that both federal and
military precedent concerning aggravated assault required that a
firearm be loaded or used as a bludgeon to be considered a
"dangerous weapon" as a matter of law.' 2 The Rivera court
refused to disregard the federal and military precedent in favor of
the Supreme Court's decision in McLaughlin, concluding that
6 Id. at 577.
Id. at 577 n.3.
8 476 U.S. 16 (1986).
9 Id. at 17.
'o Id. at 17-18.
11 40 M.J. 544, 545 (A.C.M.R. 1994).
12 Id. at 546-47.
JOURNAL OF LA W AND POLICY
McLaughlin was addressing a federal penal statute with a substan-
tially different history, purpose, and language than the military
aggravated assault statute.' 3
C. United States v Henry; Booker, and Palmer
Another significant decision similar to Sullivan, although it
deals with UCMJ Article 122, not Article 128, is United States v
Henry.'4 In Henry, the defendant appealed his conviction for
armed robbery, arguing that the firearm he used during the
commission of the crime was inoperable. The Court of Military
Appeals rejected the defendant's argument, finding that the Manual
espouses the same definition of the term "firearm" that is found in
the civilian federal criminal code and the federal sentencing
guidelines.' 5 This definition describes a firearm as any "weapon
which is designed to or may be readily converted to expel any
projectile by the action of an explosive."' 6 The court therefore
concluded that the defendant's weapon met the definition of a
firearm because the defendant could easily have converted the
handgun to operable status. The court further noted that a firearm
that is unloaded when a perpetrator uses it to commit a robbery
also can justify a charge under the enhanced sentence provision of
UCMJ Article 122, because the perpetrator easily could convert the
unloaded weapon to an operable firearm.7
Another decision of note in this context is the U.S. Navy-
Marine Corps Court of Review's decision in United States v.
Booker.' 8 In Booker, the defendant's conviction under Article 134
of the UCMJ for assaulting an officer and carrying a concealed
" Id. at 548-49. For a more in depth analysis of the decisions in Sullivan
and Rivera, see Major Barto & First Lieutenant Lucarelli, Dangerous Weapons,
Unloaded Firearms, and the Law ofjAggravated Assault: The ACMR Hangfires
in Two Conflicting Opinions, 1995-JAN. ARMY LAW. 56 (1995).
14 35 M.J. 136 (C.M.A. 1992).
"5 Id. at 137. See also Major Hunter, Court of Military Appeals Defines
"Firearm "for Purposes of UCMJ Article 122, 1992-NOv. ARMY LAW. 25, 26
(1992).
16 Hunter, supra note 15, at 26.
17 Henry, 35 M.J. at 137.
"8 37 M.J. 1114 (1993).
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weapon was affirmed. The concealed weapon was an unloaded gun
stored in the glove compartment of the defendant's car. Judge
Barnes wrote separately from the majority to dissent in part and
concur in part. Judge Barnes stated that "[t]he dangerous character
of a firearm does not depend on whether it is loaded."' 9 In a
footnote, Judge Barnes cited McLaughlin and noted that the Manual
concluded that loaded or unloaded firearms are fairly incorporated
in the definition of "dangerous weapon" contained in the UCMJ2 0
The U.S. Navy-Marine Corps Court of Review again found that
an unloaded handgun was a dangerous weapon in United States v.
Palmer." The Palmer court affirmed the conviction of the
defendant for wrongfully possessing a dangerous weapon at a naval
station in violation of a naval regulation. The court determined that
an unloaded gun is a dangerous weapon for purposes of alleged
violations of U.S. Navy Regulations charged under Article 92 of
the UCMJ. 22 However, the Palmer court specifically distinguished
its ruling as pertaining to an Article 92 charge and not an Article
128 charge.23 Furthermore, the court noted that its reasoning
followed Booker, which addressed an Article 134 charge, not an
Article 128 charge. The Palmer court felt this was a significant
distinction, as the crimes in Booker and Palmer did not involve "an
offense involving the use of an instrument or a weapon, [as Article
128 crimes do] but the gist of the offense, as in the case of
carrying a concealed weapon, consists merely in the possession of
the weapon.
' 24
II. UNITED STATES V. TURNER
In United States v Turner, the United States Army Court of
Criminal Appeals held that an unloaded pistol was not a "dangerous
weapon" that would support conviction under Article 128 for
'9 Id. at 1117.
20 Id. at 1118 n.4.
21 41 M.J. 747, 748 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1994).
22 Id. at 749-50.
21 Id. at 749.
24 Id.
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aggravated assault. In Turner, the defendant pled guilty to
aggravated assault after brandishing a pistol during the course of a
driving altercation. After his conviction, the defendant tried to
recant his plea because it was improvident on the basis of the fact
that an unloaded firearm is not a dangerous weapon under Article
128.26 The Turner court, on its own motion, considered the case
en banc to resolve the conflict between Sullivan and Rivera.27 The
Turner court ruled that a "dangerous weapon" for purposes of
Article 128(b)(1) of the UCMJ, is a weapon that has the "inherent
present capability of inflicting death or grievous bodily harm" and
"[a]n unloaded pistol, when presented as a firearm," under such
definition was not a "dangerous weapon.,
28
While finding that the policy concerns voiced in Sullivan were
meritorious, the Turner court noted that the President, by way of
the Manual, had "not provided for an enhanced punishment" for
assault committed when a weapon that only appears dangerous is
used.29 Since the Turner court felt that Sullivan was correct from
a policy point of view, but an incorrect reading of the controlling
authorities, the Turner court explicitly called upon the Judge
Advocate General of the Army to join with the Judge Advocates
General of the other military branches in recommending that the
President modify the Manual so that assault with a seemingly
dangerous weapon would result in the maximum sentence available
for simple assaults.3"
Judge Johnston wrote the first dissent to the majority opinion
in Turner. He began by noting the "bizarre" dichotomy that results
from the fact that someone who carries a firearm that is unloaded
in a concealed manner is subject to a more grievous maximum
punishment than someone who threatens and openly points an
unloaded firearm at another.3' Judge Johnston noted that, "[i]f the
25 42 M.J. 689, 691 (A. Crim. App. 1995).
26 Id. at 690.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 691.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 692.
" Id. (Johnston, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This is because
the Manual, for purposes of defining a dangerous weapon for the offense of
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majority view is correct ... an unloaded rifle or pistol is 'danger-
ous' for virtually all purposes in the military except when it is
proffered as a firearm during an offer-battery type assault!"32
Judge Johnston also did not accept the majority's recommendation
that the Manual be modified so that assault with a seemingly
dangerous weapon would result in the maximum sentence available
for simple assaults, because he found assault with an unloaded
firearm materially different from, and much more egregious and
blameworthy than, simple assault.33 Instead of perpetuating "the
flaws of the majority opinion," Judge Johnston called for an
interpretation of Article 128 of the UCMJ consistent with
McLaughlin v United States, which would find that an unloaded
firearm is always a "dangerous weapon."3 4
III. UNITED STATES V. DAVIS
A. Majority's Decision
In United States v Davis, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Armed Forces finally resolved the disagreement as to
whether assault with an unloaded firearm is aggravated assault.35
In Davis, the defendant had been convicted of conspiracy to
commit assault and battery, violation of a lawful general order,
assault with a dangerous weapon, and communication of a
threat.36 The military judge concluded that the weapon the
defendant used was not loaded, but convicted the defendant of
aggravated assault under Article 128 of the UCMJ, nonetheless.37
The Court of Criminal Appeals upheld the defendant's conviction
carrying a concealed weapon states that "[a] weapon is dangerous if it was
specifically designed for the purpose of doing grievous bodily harm." MANUAL
FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 112(c)(2) (1995 ed.).
32 Turner, 42 M.J at 692 (Johnston, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
13 Id. at 692 n.2.
34 Id. at 694.
3' 47 M.J. 484 (C.A.A.F. 1998).
36 id.
17 Id. at 485.
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for aggravated assault.3 8 Subsequently the Judge Advocate General
of the Navy certified to the CAAF the question of whether under
Article 128 of the UCMJ an assault with a dangerous weapon can
be committed with an unloaded gun, if the victim has a reasonable
apprehension of death or grievous bodily harm and the victim is
unaware of whether the gun is loaded or operable.39
The CAAF, limiting its decision to the circumstances of the
case, held that an unloaded weapon is not a dangerous weapon
under Article 128." ° The CAAF first noted that despite the
hierarchical military sources of rights, if "'a lower source creates
rules that are constitutional and provide greater rights for the
individual"' such lower source is controlling.4 The CAAF found
that it was not clear from either the plain meaning of Article 128
or its legislative history that an unloaded weapon qualifies as a
dangerous weapon under the statute. 42 Next, the CAAF noted that
the President establishes the Manual for Courts-Martial by
executive order, and that paragraph 54c(4)(a)(ii) of Part IV of the
Manual states that "an unloaded pistol, when presented as a firearm
and not as a bludgeon, is not a dangerous weapon or a means of
force likely to produce bodily harm, whether or not the assailant
knew it was unloaded.,
43
The CAAF further noted that it is not bound by the President's
interpretation of the elements of substantive offenses.44 Nonethe-
less, the CAAF concluded that where the President unambiguously
gives an accused greater rights, the CAAF will follow such
guidance unless it contradicts the express language of the UCMJ.




41 Davis, 47 M.J. at 485-486 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 35 M.J. 35,
39 (C.M.A. 1992)). The order of the sources of rights is "'the Constitution of the
United States; Federal Statutes, including the Uniform Code of Military Justice;
Executive Orders containing the Military Rules of Evidence, Department of
Defense Directives; service directives; and Federal common law."' Id. at 485
(quoting Lopez, 35 M.J. at 39).
42 Id. at 486.
43 Id.
44 Id. (citing United States v. Mance, 26 M.J. 244, 252 (C.M.A. 1988)).
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UCMJ, and in deference to the President, the CAAF held that
pursuant to the Manual an unloaded pistol is not a dangerous
weapon under Article 128. 45
In a footnote, the CAAF rejected the contention that the
Supreme Court's ruling in McLaughlin v. United States46 was
determinative of the definition of a dangerous weapon for purposes
of Article 128 of the UCMJ. The CAAF found that the McLaughlin
decision applied only to the federal bank robbery statute that was
before the Supreme Court, and was not intended to be a standard
interpretation of the definition of a dangerous weapon for all
federal criminal law.47 However, the CAAF carefully noted that
it did not share the President's opinion that the definition of
dangerous weapon under Article 128 of the UCMJ did not include
an unloaded firearm.48 The CAAF further stated that "[t]he
majority opinion does not constrain the President's authority to
change the rule, including a change that would accommodate the
policy concerns set forth in the dissenting opinion., 49 Based on its
determinations the CAAF reversed the decision of the United States
Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals, and returned the
matter for disposition consistent with the CAAF's opinion."
B. The Dissent
Judge Sullivan wrote the dissent in Davis, arguing that an
unloaded firearm should be considered a dangerous weapon under
Article 128 of the UCMJ. In Judge Sullivan's opinion the majori-
ty's decision that an unloaded firearm was not a dangerous weapon
was in clear error:
The majority reduces this crime to simple assault because
it holds that the handgun used in this case was not a
dangerous weapon. In my view, prosecutors, law enforce-
ment officials, and perhaps all victims of armed assault
45 id.
46 476 U.S. 16 (1986).
47 Davis, 47 M.J. at 487 n.*.
48 Id.
49 Id.
'0 Id. at 487.
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who have looked into the barrel of a gun or who have had
a gun held to their head would not agree with that deci-
sion. I certainly do not. I refuse to legally turn a sword
into a plowshare or a Barretta into a banana.5'
Judge Sullivan found that by the language of Article 128,
Congress clearly intended to prevent assaults by service members
using weapons that are actually dangerous or which are reasonably
perceived to be dangerous, including unloaded firearms.12 Judge
Sullivan suggested that Congress' intent in drafting Article 128 was
similar to its intent in drafting 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d), which the
Supreme Court in McLaughlin interpreted as including an unloaded
firearm within its definition of a dangerous weapon. 3 Judge
Sullivan found the Supreme Court's reasoning for why an unloaded
firearm is a dangerous weapon compelling. The Supreme Court
reached its conclusion in McLaughlin after noting that an unloaded
firearm is inherently a dangerous weapon by its very nature; the
presence of a firearm "instills fear ... [thereby] creat[ing] an
immediate danger that a violent response will ensue;" and a gun
can harm as a bludgeon. 4
IV REVISING THE MANUAL OR UCMJ ARTICLE 128
The footnote comments of the Davis majority make clear that
absent the definition of dangerous weapon supplied by the Manual,
the majority might not have concluded that an unloaded firearm is
not a dangerous weapon. Judge Sullivan's dissent further indicates
that the CAAF might consider an unloaded firearm a dangerous
weapon absent the Manual, or if the UCMJ itself gave an indica-
tion in that direction. There are convincing reasons why an
unloaded firearm should be considered a dangerous weapon.
Furthermore, punishing a service member for using a firearm in the
commission of a crime, even when such firearm is not loaded,
meets the policy concerns of punishment under American
"' Id. at 488.
52 Id.
" Id. at 488 n.2 (citing McLaughlin v. United States, 476 U.S. 16, 18 n.3
(1986)).
14 McLaughlin, 476 U.S. at 17-18 (footnote omitted).
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jurisprudence. Therefore, Congress and the President, and their
designated drafters of the UCMJ and the Manual, should consider
making revisions such that an unloaded firearm would be consid-
ered a dangerous weapon for purposes of Article 128.
A. Why an Unloaded Firearm Should be Considered a
Dangerous Weapon
The Manual or Article 128 of the UCMJ should be revised to
include an unloaded firearm as a dangerous weapon because the use
of an unloaded firearm in the commission of a crime potentially
makes the offender's action substantially more harmful. The use of
an unloaded firearm increases the chances that the victim or a
bystander will be shot; that psychological and physiological harm
will be done to the victim or a bystander; and that the offender
himself will be shot.
The use of an unloaded weapon increases the chances that the
victim or a bystander will be shot because, while the offender
might think his firearm is not loaded, it may in fact cause an
unintended discharge. Military thinking supports this concern,
because in the military all weapons are to be treated as loaded.5"
While trained service members might be less likely than untrained
civilians to accidentally discharge their firearm, a survey of recent
news accounts reveals an unfortunate number of accidental
shootings in the military56 Therefore, by bringing a weapon into
" See generally, e.g., GUIDEBOOK FOR MARINES (17th rev. ed. 1997)
(discussing safety precautions for United States Marine Corps personnel).
56 See, e.g., Army Investigating Accidental Shooting of Reserve Sergeant,
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 27, 1996, at B2; Army Rules Shooting of
Qfficer an Accident, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Aug. 25, 1995, at 4B;
Steve Farr, Air Force Rules Jet Shooting an Accident, ASSOC. PRESS, July 3,
1996, available in 1996 WL 4430155; Christopher Rickett, 'Unloaded' VMI Gun
Kills Boy, 10, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, Apr. 28, 1996, at B4; Shooting
Death of Marine an Accident, Military Says, GREENSBORO NEWS & RECORD,
Apr. 14, 1997, at B3. A survey of recent news reports also reveals a substantial
number of unfortunate accidental shootings by civilians. See, e.g., Andy Gotlieb,
Police Told "Unloaded" Gun Killed Woman, TAMPA TRIBUNE, June 4, 1997, at
1; Shooting Suspect Claims He Thought Gun Was Unloaded, TIMES UNION, Aug.
9, 1998, at D2; 'Unloaded' Weapon Fatal to Motorist, TULSA WORLD, Sept. 23,
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the often chaotic situation created by the offender's action, the
offender increases the probability that a weapon he believes is not
loaded will in fact discharge, perhaps harming or even killing the
offender's victim or a bystander. In addition, the offender's use of
even an unloaded weapon in a crime increases the probability that
the victim or a bystander will be shot by someone trying to prevent
the crime, or responding to the crime.57
A service member who brings an unloaded weapon into a
criminal situation also increases the possibility of causing psycho-
logical or physiological harm to his victim or a bystander.
[A] gun is commonly known, regarded, and treated by
society as a dangerous device by both the reasonable man
and the person at whom it is pointed, without pause to
determine whether a round is in the chamber. The primary
capacity of a gun to harm . . . plus its apparent capacity to
carry out that harm, combined with a highly charged
atmosphere and the possibility of action by employees or
others to prevent the robbery, is a complex of circumstanc-
es in which the person on the scene is in jeopardy of harm
which may occur in any one of various ways.58
This reasonable and substantial mindset caused by the offend-
er's use of a firearm in a crime, which the victim and bystander do
not know is unloaded, may cause serious psychological and
1997, at A8; Victim Thought Gun was Unloaded, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Mar.
2, 1998, at Al.
17 United States v. Hamrick, 43 F.3d 877, 883 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting that
the danger will arise because "those threatened, their rescuers, or the police, can
be expected to respond with force and possibly deadly force, and thereby
endanger the safety of victims, bystanders, and even the perpetrator").
" Baker v. United States, 412 F.2d 1069, 1071-1072 (5th Cir. 1969) (finding
an unloaded gun conclusively dangerous), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1018 (1970).
See also United States v. Martinez-Jimenez, 864 F.2d 664, 666-67 (9th Cir.)
(noting that the robber subjected victim to very real fear of harm even though
gun was fake, and holding that a toy gun used in bank robbery constituted a
dangerous weapon as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d), the federal bank robbery
statute), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1099 (1989); United States v. Newkirk, 481 F.2d
881, 883 (4th Cir. 1973) (citing United States v. Shelton, 465 F.2d 361 (4th Cir.
1972) (holding that a weapon that appears capable of placing life in danger
constitutes a dangerous weapon)), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1145 (1974).
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physiological harm to the victim and/or the bystander which endure
long after the crime has been committed.5 9 In addition, the fear
created by the use of a weapon in a crime, whether it is loaded or
unloaded, may cause harm from disorganized fleeing and panicked
response.6"
Finally, the service member's use of an unloaded firearm
increases the possibility that the service member himself will be
harmed or killed. Those responding to the crime and trying to
prevent it, fearing the service member is armed, might employ
deadly force against the service member.61 Increasing the punish-
ment for offenders who use an unloaded weapon might in fact be
in the best interest of offenders, by discouraging such behavior.
B. Treating an Unloaded Firearm as a Dangerous Weapon
Serves Objectives of Punishment
Characterizing an unloaded firearm as a dangerous weapon for
purposes of Article 128 of the UCMJ also serves the four tradition-
al objectives of punishment: retribution, rehabilitation, deterrence,
and incapacitation.62 Under a retributive vision of justice,
punishment is justified by the need to compensate society for the
" United States v. Medved, 905 F.2d 935, 940 (6th Cir. 1990) (noting that
fear from fake weapon can cause heart attacks and other adverse consequences),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1101 (1991).
60 Hamrick, 43 F.3d at 883; Unloaded Gun Can Support Criminal
Recklessness Charge, NAT'L L. J., Jan. 22, 1996, at B15 (stating that the
Supreme Court of Indiana ruled that an unloaded gun created a substantial risk
of bodily harm because it can create a variety of bodily risks).
6 Martinez-Jimenez, 864 F.2d at 666; United States v. Beasley, 438 F.2d
1279, 1283 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 866 (1971). See also Man Killed
by Police Had Unloaded Gun, SUNDAY PATRIOT-NEWS HARRISBURG, Jan. 15,
1995, at B8; Kieran Nicholson, 12-year-old Suspect's Gun Unloaded, PoliceSay,
DENVER POST, Feb. 4, 1998, at B3; Kathleen Ostarnder, Police Provide Details
of Standoff Shooting Man's Gun Was Unloaded, Janesville Officer Was Justified,
Chief Says, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, Dec. 3, 1996, at 5; Police Say Man
Killed By Officer Had Unloaded Gun, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Sept. 13,
1997, at 5B; Tom Searls, Man Killed By Belle Officer Had Unloaded Gun, His
Brother Says, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Feb. 20, 1997, at P3C.
62 Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture. and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH.
L. REV. 1880, 1890 (1991).
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harm inflicted by the offender. 3 The conceptual underpinnings of
this view favor proportionality by striking a moral balance between
the punishment inflicted and the gravity of the crime.64 As noted
above, bringing an unloaded firearm into a criminal situation
increases the risk of injury to the victim, bystanders, and the
offender himself. The offender thereby harms the secure nature of
society by introducing chaos and fear of harm, and causes potential
harm to the individual members of society. Increasing the punish-
ment to the offender for the increased harm and potential harm is
thus a balanced "compensation" to society In addition, the service
member who uses a firearm in a crime betrays the military society
which respects the need for firearms in defense of the nation. By
using a firearm in a crime the service member uses a tool associat-
ed with the military in a manner contrary to the exact principles the
military stands to protect. Given the potential grievous consequenc-
es introduced by the use of the unloaded firearm, and the damage
an offender causes to military society and society at large through
his use of the unloaded firearm, an increased punishment is in
proportion to the aggravated crime.
Punishment has also been justified on the theory of rehabilita-
tion. Through rehabilitation a criminal is taught attitudes, values,
habits and skills by which he can function productively and
lawfully.65 Rehabilitation can take constructive or destructive
forms, either helping offenders change their attitude and behavior,
or imposing negative stimuli to teach offenders to avoid wrongful
behavior.66 Characterizing an unloaded firearm as a dangerous
63 Brian J. Telpner, Note, Constructing Safe Communities: Megan's Laws
and the Purposes of Punishment, 85 GEO. L.J. 2039, 2055-56 (1997).
64 Robert Blecker, Haven or Hell? Inside Lorton Central Prison. Experiences
of Punishment Justified, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1149, 1164 (1990). Immanuel Kant,
the philosophical forefather of retributivism, argued that punishment "can never
be used merely as a means to promote some other good for the criminal himself
or for civil society, but ... must in all cases be imposed on him only on the
ground that he has committed a crime." David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of
Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1623, 1627 (1992) (citing IMMANUEL KANT,
THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 100 (John Ladd trans., 1965). Thus,
punishment is conceived as an end in itself. Dolinko, supra, at 1627.
65 See Massaro, supra note 62, at 1893-95.
66 Telpner, supra note 63, at 2058-59.
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weapon for purposes of Article 128 helps rehabilitate the service
member as a negative stimuli which teaches the offender to avoid
wrongful behavior. Furthermore, by increasing the deference with
which even an unloaded firearm must be treated, an increased
punishment removes stimuli which contributed to the initial offense,
such negative stimuli being the casual disrespect for a firearm and
its use.
The purpose of punishment under the deterrence model is to
prevent future crimes by the same wrongdoer or by others.6"
Deterrence therefore also takes two forms: "specific deterrence" or
"general deterrence." Under a specific deterrence model, punish-
ment is justified because a wrongdoer will be deterred from
repeating the same acts.68 Specific deterrence is similar to the
rehabilitation rationale; both focus on the future behavior of the
individual wrongdoer. 9 Under a general deterrence model, by
contrast, punishment is justified as a deterrence to all members of
society 0 Utilitarianism is the philosophical foundation of deter-
rence-based punishment. Punishment, though arguably imposing
some "evil" in its own right, is justified because it maximizes the
good for the greatest number by preventing harmful acts from
occurring in the future.7 Defining an unloaded firearm as a
dangerous weapon under Article 128 serves the ends of both
specific and general deterrence. Increasing the punishment for an
offender who uses an unloaded firearm in the commission of a
crime deters the offender from callously using an unloaded firearm
again in the future because the offender realizes that using an
unloaded firearm increases the risk of grievous harm and using an
unloaded firearm will engender greater punishment. Furthermore,
increasing the punishment for the use of an unloaded firearm under
Article 128 will likely deter all service members from using an
unloaded firearm in the commission of a crime.
The incapacitation justification for punishment argues that the
key to punishment is disabling the offender from committing crime
67 Massaro, supra note 62, at 1895-96.
68 Massaro, supra note 62, at 1896.
69 Blecker, supra note 64, at 1197.
70 Telpner, supra note 63, at 2061.
7 Telpner, supra note 63, at 2061.
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in the future. Punishment should "protect the community from the
offender, either by confining her physically, or otherwise disabling
her from committing future crimes."72 Incapacitation justifies
imposing external controls on offenders to minimize the future risk
to society 3 Since an offender who uses an unloaded firearm in
the commission of a crime increases risk of harm to others and
himself, he demonstrates a need for society to put greater controls
and better protect itself than if the offender committed the crime
without the firearm. Therefore, a greater punishment is necessitated.
C. Means of Change
Because the CAAF in Davis found that Congress' will as
embodied in the UCMJ trumps the Manual and that Article 128
was silent as to an unloaded firearm whereas the Manual distin-
guished it from a dangerous weapon, the CAAF would be free to
interpret an unloaded firearm as a dangerous weapon if the
President by executive order revised the Manual to include such
definition or if Congress revised Article 128 to include such
definition. While either option is viable, an executive order might
be a quicker, more efficient manner of making the change.
Executive orders have become a frequent and powerful tool of
presidential policymaking.74 Since the 1930's executive orders
have assumed an ever increasing legislative character, directly
affecting the rights and duties of governmental officials.75
Executive orders do not require congressional approval and thereby
72 Massaro, supra note 62, at 1899.
3 Massaro, supra note 62, at 1899.
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enable the President to bypass parliamentary debate and opposi-
tion.76 In contrast, legislative action by Congress entails significant
and time consuming debate.77 The speed and efficiency that
executive orders grant the President therefore makes an executive
order the appropriate mechanism to amend the Manual to define an
unloaded firearm as a dangerous weapon for the purposes of
aggravated crimes.
76 See Joel L. Fleishman & Arthur H. Aufses, Law & Orders.: The Problem
of Presidential Legislation, 40 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 6, 38-39 (1976);
Steven Ostrow, Enforcing Executive Orders. Judicial Review of Agency Action
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 659 (1987).
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(1991).

